

TLS ♥ DNS ♥ Tor

equinox

31C3, Hamburg, 2014-12-30

# wtf is this shit?

- ▶ this is not a crypto talk
- ▶ this is not a DNSsec talk


# wtf is this shit?

- ▶ this is not a crypto talk
- ▶ this is not a DNSsec talk
- ▶ this is a layer 9 talk


# okay?

- ▶ please do DNSsec and DANE
- ▶ they're good things and here's why


# DNSsec and DANE in 60 seconds



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# Issues

- ▶ DNSsec as a protocol sucks
- ▶ ICANN has the root keys
- ▶ TLD operator has TLD keys
- ▶ NSA/... can request keys



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- ▶ TLD operator has TLD keys
- ▶ NSA/... can request keys  
and attack your internet connection

# Trust relations

After forcing the TLD operator to hand over their keys, the NSA can go break your internet wire and MitM on the DNSsec replies

Or they just tell the TLD operator to give different replies to you (or everyone).

# But.

- ▶ single hierarchy
- ▶ online system

# DNSsec ♥ Tor

***DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS***




**domain  
owner**



**user**

# DNSsec ♥ Tor

**DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS DNS**



# Whoop Whoop Whoop

- ▶ using Tor as common base
- ▶ hopefully, targeting individual Tor users across multiple requests is difficult
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- ▶ hopefully, targeting individual Tor users across multiple requests is difficult
- ▶ Owner checks info in Tor, User checks info in Tor
- ▶ **additional trust chain**

# DNSsec and DANE pretty-please!

- ▶ Firefox & Chrome: boo!
- ▶ postfix & irssi: yay!
  
- ▶ needs domain owners' action
- ▶ needs registrars' action
- ▶ could use special DNS support in Tor



# Play with the tools we have

No new protocol in this talk, no new crypto algorithm, no X509 extensions.

Just creativity with existing tools!

Fuck the X509 CA scheme.

questions?  
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